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Supplementary Table S1: Means and standard deviations (SD) for all measures of prosociality obtained at T0 to T3, depicted 
separately for each experimental cohort.  
 
 
 
 
  T0   T1   T2   T3  
  N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Group 1 - TC1                   
DG 81 34.86 17.18 77 33.73 17.59 76 35.21 17.55 73 37.53 18.22 
Strategic giving  81 4.91 18.69 77 8.16 19.66 76 6.02 16.75 73 3.01 15.99 
TG  81 39.16 30.24 77 36.11 26.39 76 35.71 29.38 73 35.81 28.57 
2nd PPG  81 27.97 22.05 77 24.12 22.17 76 19.38 18.70 73 19.41 19.45 
3rd PPG  81 30.11 22.71 77 30.08 23.36 76 24.85 23.31 73 22.02 22.21 
ZPG helping  78 61.15 27.21 77 68.83 22.88 75 66.93 23.07 73 63.97 23.91 
ZPG cost effect 78 3.21 31.56 77 16.88 32.30 75 20.33 35.76 73 24.66 35.96 
Social Discounting  68 0.05 0.10 64 0.07 0.11 68 0.09 0.19 64 0.05 0.12 
SVO  79 6.28 3.56 73 6.33 3.64 76 6.89 3.42 74 6.85 3.58 
Donation 79 27.88 14.26 79 30.12 14.29 77 33.39 14.37 73 31.90 15.04 
Prosocial Scale 79 3.27 0.49 73 3.45 0.54 77 3.46 0.56 74 3.55 0.52 
Machiavelli Index 79 2.96 2.34 73 2.62 2.53 76 2.00 1.91 74 1.91 1.86 
IRI 80 22.28 2.48 73 22.49 2.57 77 22.69 2.42 74 22.77 2.33 
Group 2 - TC2             
DG 78 32.83 18.09 77 33.00 16.90 73 33.46 19.16 74 35.94 16.23 
Strategic giving  78 11.74 23.33 77 10.93 18.52 73 7.96 20.36 74 8.03 15.05 
TG  78 40.55 29.91 77 42.05 32.12 73 41.82 32.80 74 43.16 33.15 
2nd PPG  78 28.77 22.24 77 24.96 21.83 73 24.29 21.99 74 21.67 20.56 
3rd PPG  78 33.70 24.52 77 31.56 25.00 73 29.00 24.63 74 27.93 24.94 
ZPG helping  78 63.59 26.18 72 68.61 23.93 73 68.77 21.60 74 67.43 22.82 
ZPG cost_effect 78 14.74 28.90 72 16.32 32.81 73 17.81 38.30 74 23.99 36.41 
Social Discounting  61 0.05 0.05 73 0.08 0.14 72 0.05 0.07 69 0.06 0.12 
SVO  79 5.92 3.54 75 6.59 3.33 75 6.44 3.55 57 7.33 3.03 
Donation 78 26.99 14.70 77 30.11 13.41 75 32.18 14.90 71 35.09 14.26 
Prosocial Scale 79 3.34 0.54 76 3.47 0.53 73 3.64 0.50 74 3.73 0.53 
Machiavelli Index 79 2.80 2.23 77 2.84 2.44 73 2.70 2.60 74 1.95 2.34 
IRI 80 22.87 2.21 76 22.55 2.39 73 23.11 2.32 74 23.18 2.21 
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Group 3 - TC3             
DG 80 35.53 15.29 77 36.06 17.08       
Strategic giving  80 5.91 15.59 77 6.98 19.22       
TG  80 43.02 31.21 77 42.43 31.63       
2nd PPG  80 30.41 20.64 77 24.42 21.50       
3rd PPG  80 30.57 22.11 77 27.13 24.22       
ZPG helping  81 69.88 22.89 76 69.74 25.35       
ZPG cost_effect 81 6.79 31.38 76 10.53 33.73       
Social Discounting  70 0.05 0.08 69 0.04 0.05       
SVO  79 6.05 3.65 76 6.91 3.01       
Donation 80 29.92 14.92 78 34.54 12.92       
Prosocial Scale 79 3.52 0.59 76 3.49 0.53       
Machiavelli Index 79 2.46 2.49 76 1.97 1.87       
IRI 79 22.29 2.38 76 22.69 2.15       
Group 0/4 - RCC             
DG 88 33.32 18.63 83 30.49 18.49 82 29.08 18.87 79 29.19 18.70 
Strategic giving  88 7.21 25.29 83 10.97 18.00 82 5.85 19.10 79 6.31 23.08 
TG  88 41.88 31.90 83 37.43 30.66 82 29.59 22.40 79 33.57 30.69 
2nd PP  88 32.79 23.63 83 31.20 21.57 82 27.18 21.07 79 24.71 20.62 
3rd  PP  88 35.26 21.88 82 34.34 22.59 82 29.59 22.40 79 28.56 22.95 
ZPG helping  89 64.16 23.15 84 63.69 24.39 80 66.13 20.28 78 65.00 20.37 
ZPG cost_effect 89 9.27 30.94 84 13.10 34.38 80 31.88 36.88 78 35.26 41.18 
Social Discounting  77 0.10 0.15 74 0.10 0.13 70 0.11 0.18 66 0.11 0.16 
SVO  85 5.53 3.91 84 5.88 3.77 79 5.90 3.77 79 6.66 3.52 
Donation 88 26.42 12.49 83 27.28 12.96 82 27.10 14.87 78 26.89 14.99 
Prosocial Scale 85 3.39 0.59 84 3.43 0.55 79 3.46 0.61 79 3.47 0.58 
Machiavelli Index 85 3.47 3.20 84 3.51 3.18 79 3.43 3.45 79 3.24 3.70 
IRI 86 22.65 2.35 84 22.25 2.57 78 22.13 2.50 79 22.23 2.34 
DG =Dictator Game, TG = Trust Game, 2nd PPG = 2nd Person Punishment Game, 3rd PPG = 3rd Person Punishment Game, ZPG = Zurich 
Prosocial Game, SVO = Social Value Orientation, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
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Supplements S2: Model specification and solution for multiple time points confirmatory 
factor analyses (MT-CFAs) 
 
Supplementary Table S2a: Standardized factor loadings (β) for individual measures of 
prosociality in the scalar invariance model at all time points. All factor loadings were significant. 
Note that the relation between the measure Social Discounting and the factor Self-Reported 
Prosocial Behaviour was not modelled in present analyses, as it was only added in a data-driven 
manner in (2, 3) .  
 
 T0 T1 T2 T3 
Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour     
ZPG Helping .372 .388  .472  .482  
SVO .467 .513 .539 .571 
Social Discounting -.417 -.412 -.347 -.401 
TG .421 .442 .495 .498 
Donation .373 .414 .427 .428 
DG .610 .608 .651 .710 
Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour     
2nd Party Punishment .779 .862 .901 .894 
3rd Party Punishment .784 .801 .785 .776 
Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour     
Prosocialness Scal .868 .839 .799 .891 
IRI .420 .379 .383 .440 
Machiavelli Scale -.317 -.308 -.293 -.317 
 
DG =Dictator Game, TG = Trust Game, 2nd PPG = 2nd Person Punishment Game, 3rd PPG = 3rd 
Person Punishment Game, ZPG = Zurich Prosocial Game, SVO = Social Value Orientation, IRI = 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
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Supplementary Table S2b: Unstandardized factor loadings (β) for individual measures of 
prosociality in the scalar invariance model at all time points. All factor loadings were significant.  
 
 T0 T1 T2 T3 
Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour     
ZPG Helping .858 .858 .858 .858 
SVO .160 .160 .160 .160 
Social Discounting -.004 -.004 -.004 -.004 
TG 1.222 1.222 1.222 1.222 
Donation .511 .511 .511 .511 
DG 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour     
2nd Party Punishment 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
3rd Party Punishment 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour     
Prosocialness Scal .497 .497 .497 .497 
IRI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Machiavelli Scale -.865 -.865 -.865 -.865 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table S2c: Coefficients of autocorrelations for latent factors across time in the 
scalar invariance model. All correlations were significant. 
 T0 T1 T2 
Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour    
T1 .896    
T2 .827 .877  
T3 .771 .803 .952 
Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour    
T1 .686    
T2 .617 .777  
T3 .531 .773 .850 
Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour    
T1 .923    
T2 .897 .979  
T3 .696 .805 .883 
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Supplementary Table S2d: Coefficients for latent factors correlations within each time point. No 
correlations were significant. 
 T0 T1 T2 T3 
AMPB – NMPB .065 .060  .050 -.021 
AMPB – SRPB .067 .023 -.030 .002 
NMPB – SRPB .036 .034 -.034 -.001 
 
AMPB = Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour; NMPB = Norm Motivated Prosocial 
Behaviour; SRPB = Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour 
 
  
Böckler et al., malleability of altruism 
 
Supplementary Table S3: Reasons for missing data within the ReSource Project in the context 
of which the present study was conducted.  
 
Reasons N   
Participants originally enrolled in the study 332  
Drop out during T0 2  
Drop out during T1 10 
Drop out during T2 7  
Drop out during T3 7  
Participants with missing measurement(s) at T0 due to scheduling/technical problems 16 
Participants with missing measurement(s) at T1 due to scheduling/technical problems 22 
Participants with missing measurement(s) at T2 due to scheduling/technical problems 14 
Participants with missing measurement(s) at T3 due to scheduling/technical problems 9 
Missing data in the social discounting task due to ‘multiple cross-over’* or outlier at T0 56 
Missing data in the social discounting task due to ‘multiple cross-over’ or outlier at T1 36 
Missing data in the social discounting task due to ‘multiple cross-over’ or outlier at T2 19 
Missing data in the social discounting task due to ‘multiple cross-over’ or outlier at T3 24 
* see Jones & Rachlin, 2006  
Study dropout did not differ between TC1, TC2, TC3 and RCC: T0 (TC1, TC2, TC3, RCC): 0, 0, 0, 2; T1: 
2, 2, 3, 3; T2: 2 3, -, 2; T3: 4, 1, -, 2. 
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Supplement S4: Results for individual measures of strategic prosocial behaviour. 
 
 
The original model of human prosociality also included measures assessing strategic prosocial 
behaviour, related to the inclination to make prosocial choices dependent upon whether they benefit 
oneself (2). However, further investigation is required to confirm whether a separate strategy factor 
can be established (3). For the sake of completeness, we provide details on individual measures of 
strategic prosocial behaviour included in the ReSource Project and their training-induced plasticity. 
 
Training-induced changes in prosociality 
Cost-effect. No significant differences in the cost-effect were revealed at baseline (F(3, 822.75) = 
1.76, p = .154). The LMM revealed a main effect of time (F(3, 580.32) = 17.98, p = .000), reflecting 
increases in cost-benefit oriented behaviour over the course of the study. The main effect of group 
was not significant (F < 1.04). However, the two-way interaction of time and group reached 
significance (F(7, 594.40) = 2.67, p = .010), due to a strong increase in the cost-effect over time in 
the RCC (F(3, 489.37) = 14.95, p = .000), but no such effect in the majority of training cohorts  
(TC1: F(3, 492.57) = 8.19, p = .000; TC2: F(3, 497.64) = 1.37, p = .250; TC3: F(1, 659.87) = 0.66, 
p = .417).  
Module-specific analyses showed that the increase in the cost-effect over time was 
significantly different from zero with a medium effect-size in the RCC (t(83) = 5.14, p = 000, d = 
.56), suggesting increasing strategic behaviour in this group. A similar, though weaker, effect was 
found after the Presence Module (t(144) = 2.37, p = .019, d = .20; surviving correction for multiple 
comparisons), but not after the other training modules (ts ≤ 1.53, ps ≥ .126). When comparing the 
increase in cost-benefit oriented behaviour in the RCC and training modules, no significant 
differences were found, however (ts ≤ 1.70, ps ≥ .090). These results indicate that over the course 
Böckler et al., malleability of altruism 
 
of the study, participants increasingly incorporated cost-benefit calculations into their decisions, a 
tendency that was especially prevalent in the RCC. The absence of a respective increase in most of 
the training cohorts and after the later modules (Affect and Perspective) suggest that continuous 
mental training may buffer the increase of strategic behaviour and seld-interest that is otherwise 
observed when people become familiar with the tasks (and how to increase one’s personal gains).  
Strategic giving. No significant differences in strategic giving were revealed at baseline (F(3, 
1037.19) = 1.97, p = .117). The LMM revealed a marginal effect of time (F(3, 654.50) = 2.51, p = 
.058), reflecting a tendency for decreases in strategic giving over the course of the study. The main 
effect of group was not significant (F(3, 317.20) = 2.25, p = .082) and neither the two-way 
interaction of time and group (F < 1). These findings suggest that strategic giving is not altered due 
to any of the mental trainings.  
 
Correlations between training-induced changes in prosociality 
We found a significant correlation between training-induced increases in altruistically 
motivated prosocial behaviour and training-induced reductions of the cost-effect in the ZPG (r = -
.15, p = .022; surviving correction for multiple comparisons). This finding suggests that the more 
the meditation based training induces altruistic motivations, the more it reduces self-centred 
strategic considerations when faced with other’s needs. Hence, people who became more motivated 
to enhance others’ well-being over the course of the training became also less concerned with their 
own (monetary) advantage in strategic cooperative settings. This finding may point towards a more 
general antagonistic relationship between altruism and egoism, in that shifts towards the motivation 
to care for and support others (4, 5) may be inherently linked to shifts away from the motivation to 
maximize self-interest and own ressources (5, 6). 
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Supplement S5: Results for module comparisons. 
 
 
The main aim of the present study was to investigate which mental training modules effectively 
enhance which facet of prosociality and, consequently, we compared effects of the three mental 
training modules to changes in the RCC. To directly address differences between the three training 
modules (independent of RCC), we performed additional LMMs for each sub-component of 
prosociality, specifying the factors module (4 levels: Baseline, Presence, Affect, Perspective), time 
(4 levels: T0, T1, T2, T3), and random intercepts for participants. Continuous time was added as a 
repeated statement with the AR(1) covariance structure. Gender and age were included as control 
variables.  
Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour. Results of the LMM showed no significant 
main effect of module and no two-way interaction of time and module (Fs < 1.58, ps ≥ .20). This 
finding suggests that though only the Affect Module significantly enhanced altruistic behaviours 
above changes in the RCC, training effects did not differ significantly between the modules.  
Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour. Results of the LMM revealed neither a significant 
main effect of module nor a two-way interaction of time and module (Fs < 2.62, ps ≥ .10). This 
finding further supports previous results, indicating that norm-based behaviours were not 
(differentially) altered by any form of mental training.  
Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour. Neither the main effect of module nor the two-way 
interaction of time and module reached significance (Fs < 1.1, ps ≥ .36). Hence, the training-induced 
increases in self-reported prosociality did not differ between the training modules.  
Strategic Behaviour (i.e. Cost-effect and strategic giving). For the Cost-effect, results of the 
LMM showed no significant main effect of module and no two-way interaction of time and module 
(Fs < 1.05, ps ≥ .31). Similarly, there was neither a significant main effect of module nor a two-
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way interaction of time and module for strategic giving (Fs < 1.45, ps ≥ .23). These results suggest 
that the training modules did not differ regarding their influence on strategic behaviours.  
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